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AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON RETAIL 
INTERNATIONALIZATION SUCCESS: HOME DEPOT IN CHILE 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study utilizes institutional theory to assess the effect of the host institutional 
environment on the success of internationalizing retailers. According to this framework, 
retailers succeed in international markets when they adapt their retail format and practices 
to the salient institutional norms in the host market and achieve legitimation from the 
relevant social actors. This framework was used in a case study of Home Depot’s entry 
into Chile in 1998 and its exit three years later. Findings showed that Home Depot lacked 
legitimacy in Chile because they failed to offer the range of merchandise and store 
atmosphere demanded by the traditional family shopping activity, and because their 
management team did not embed themselves in the broader social network. It was also 
apparent the competition had anticipated and responded to Home Depot’s source of 
competitive advantage and that Home Depot’s scale was not great enough to command 
any advantages in the supply chain network.  
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AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON RETAIL INTERNATIONALIZATION 
SUCCESS: HOME DEPOT IN CHILE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
An industry that has rapidly become more internationalized is retailing. Many of the 
world’s prominent retailers already derive a significant proportion of their sales from 
international operations. Wal-Mart, for instance, has 1,288 stores in its international 
division, which generate 16.7% of its annual sales (Wal*Mart Annual Report  2003). 
Although these retailers are very successful in their home countries, they often encounter 
difficulties in the foreign marketplace due to the complexities of local zoning regulations, 
and differences in consumer tastes and local workforces. These obstacles hinder retailer 
international performance and although retailers are successful in some markets, at the 
same time they may lack success in other venues.  
A recent example of mixed internationalization performance is shown by the U.S. 
retailer of home improvement, Home Depot. This firm internationalized successfully to 
Canada in 1994, and continued its internationalization process by entering Chile in 1998 
and Argentina in 1999. Although Home Depot believed that its source of competitive 
advantage would lead to success, operations in Chile and Argentina resulted in losses that 
led to withdrawal from both countries (El Mercurio, Sept. 29, 2001).   
These ineffective internationalization efforts suggest that a retailer’s home-based 
source of competitive advantage may not be transferable to all markets. Previous studies 
show that differences in the environment between countries can diminish the effective 
transfer of the source of competitive advantage (e.g., O’Grady and Lane 1996). However, 
more research is needed to better understand what elements of the host environment of a 
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foreign country affects the behavior and performance of international retailers, and how 
retailers can deal effectively with these differences to achieve success. Thus, the main 
objective of this study is to address retail internationalization success, and specifically the 
impact of the foreign environment on the performance of international retailers. For this 
purpose, institutional theory is introduced as a theoretical framework for attaining this 
objective.  
Institutional theory is a theoretical perspective that focuses on organizational 
conformity to economic and social norms. Institutional theory suggests that every country 
has a set of relevant institutional norms that retailers must conform to in order to be 
perceived as legitimate by the relevant social actors. These norms are described as 
institutional norms of retailing, and variation in the saliency of these norms of retailing 
across countries is attributed to differences in their history, culture and economy. Overall, 
this institutional approach suggests that internationalization success will increase when 
retailers achieve legitimacy from social actors by adapting their practices and structures 
to the salient institutional norms.   
An empirical base is developed through a case study of Home Depot’s operation 
in Chile. The findings support the contention that differences in the saliency of 
institutional norms of retailing exist between the home and host country (in this case the 
U.S. and Chile). Furthermore, the data suggest that the lack of retail internationalization 
success for Home Depot was affected by the inability of this international retail firm to 
gain legitimation from relevant host social actors in Chile, as a result of not complying 
with the salient institutional norms of retailing of this new market.   
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This study contributes to the field of retailing by providing new insights on the 
internationalization process of retail firms. Specifically, it attempts to identify some of 
the environmental factors that might affect internationalization success for retailers in 
foreign markets, a concept that is still under researched. For international retail managers, 
a contribution of this study is the acknowledgement of variation in the institutional 
environment across countries and the understanding the effect of these differences on 
retailer performance. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The process of retail internationalization has been the subject of recent theoretical and 
empirical research (e.g., Alexander and Myers 2000). Due to this increased retail 
internationalization activity, a vast amount of retail literature has emerged that looks at 
motives for retail international expansion (e.g., Treadgold and Davis 1988; Wrigley 1989; 
Alexander 1990 1995; Williams 1992; Myers 1995), the extent and direction of 
international retail activity (Robinson and Clarke-Hill 1990; Treadgold 1991; Davies and 
Sanghavi 1995; Sternquist 1997), individual company experiences (Sparks 1995; Clarke 
and Rimmer 1997; Laulajainen 1991; Wrigley 1997), and divestment (Alexander and 
Quinn 2002). Additionally, several theoretical frameworks attempt to address the retail 
internationalization process (Salmon and Tordjman 1989; Dawson1994; Sternquist 1997; 
Vida and Fairhurst 1998; and Alexander and Myers 2000).  
Although the contribution of these studies is notable, retail scholars insist that 
more theoretical work is needed, especially on post-internationalization aspects such as 
internationalization success (Alexander and Myers 2000; Akehurst and Alexander 1996). 
For example, Alexander and Myers (2000) noted “while specific research work has 
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established an understanding of what has happened and the pressures and tensions that 
have influenced international activity, a suitably developed conceptual framework has not 
been achieved”.   
Retail Internationalization Success 
Research that addresses internationalization success (and failure) has been 
generally composed of historical case studies of specific retailers (e.g., Sparks 1995; 
Dupuis and Prime 1996). These studies suggest that the foreign environment may have an 
important impact on internationalization success. Regulatory, geographical, economic, 
cultural, psychic and administrative differences between countries are seen as generating 
costs, risks, and barriers for internationalizing firms (Davies 1995; Alexander 1997; 
Dupuis and Prime 1996; O’Grady and Lane 1997; Samiee 1995; Ackerman and Tellis 
2001). For instance, Wal-Mart has made slow progress in expanding their European 
business due to regulations on pricing and promotions and on store opening hours as well 
as strict land planning regulation (Guy 2001). This research also highlights that it is 
important not only to understand environmental differences, but also to adapt properly to 
new conditions to achieve success (O’Grady and Lane 1997; Evans et. al. 2000; 
Tordjman 1988). For example, Peñaloza and Gilly’s (1999) work on acculturation 
showed that retailers frequently interacted with other relevant agents in the market place 
in addition to consumers, such as family, employees, channel members, competitors, and 
business associations.  
Overall, the current paper emphasizes that international retailers must consider 
elements of the social environment (e.g., family, community and social responsibility) as 
well as elements from the economic environment of retailing (market, suppliers, 
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competitors, consumers) to achieve retail internationalization success. This is consistent 
with previous studies that show that retail actions are affected by pressures from their 
institutional environment (e.g., Arnold, Kozinets, and Handelman 2001). Continuing with 
this line of reasoning, and drawing from organizational theory, we introduce institutional 
theory as an alternative approach for addressing the internationalization of retailing.  
Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory views organizations as embedded in networks of social 
relationships (Granovetter 1985). The main premise of institutional theory is that the 
institutional environment is composed of institutions that exert normative pressures for 
the structures and practices of social actors (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott and Meyer 
1983). Under this theoretical framework, the ultimate goal of a firm is survival, and 
organizations conform to institutional norms, to increase their legitimacy and survival 
capabilities (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977).  
Institutional theory directs the attention to the relevant social actors who 
participate in the organization’s environment, who are not just competing firms, 
suppliers, employees or consumers, but also trade associations, professional boards, 
church, unions, government, politicians, families and environmental protection or 
consumer activist organizations. These social actors are crucial in an institutional 
framework because they shape the relevant institutional norms in the organization’s 
environment and at the same time, respond to them by conforming to these norms.  
Institutional norms refer to appropriate expectations of behavior that are 
acceptable within an institutional environment, and act as unwritten rules of proper social 
conduct to which organizations must adhere in order to become legitimated (Scott 1987). 
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For culturally similar countries, such as the U.S. and Canada, retail practices may need 
little modification. However, in other cases, the saliency of norms of retailing may differ 
significantly across countries. Saliency of institutional norms of retailing refer to the 
importance that social actors within a country assign to certain norms over others. Norms 
that are much more linked with idiosyncrasies and cultural values, will probably differ 
across countries. For example, some countries may consider the norms of nationalism as 
salient over other norms when legitimizing an organization due to historical events such 
as wars, or invasion.    
Organizational legitimacy represents the end result of evaluation by social actors, 
who compare the organization’s actions and practices to established norms that exist 
within the organization’s environment (Suchman 1995). Legitimacy of an organization 
influences the willingness of social actors to support that organization (e.g., Handelman 
and Arnold 1999). However, in an international context, organizational legitimacy is 
more complex because international organizations are simultaneously subject to 
institutional pressures by social actors in the home market (e.g. parent firm), and the host 
market (e.g., host consumers). This implies that suppliers, consumers, agencies and other 
relevant social actors from both the domestic and international environments must be 
considered for legitimation purposes. Thus, the conceptualization of internationalization 
success under this institutional approach is the ability of international firms to gain 
legitimacy from relevant social actors by conforming to institutional norms of their 
environments.  
Consumers legitimize retailers that adhere to norms of  low prices, convenience, 
assortment, quality, and service. Suppliers legitimize a retailer based on the adherence to 
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relational norms and fair exchanges. Employees will legitimize a retailer that conforms 
with human resource practices, and consumers will legitimize a retailer that provides 
competitive prices, wide assortment, service quality and convenience. Governments 
legitimize international retailers based on their compliance to laws and regulations. 
Additionally, families will legitimize a retailer that provide facilities and entertainment 
for the family, and support for the community. Finally, shareholders will legitimize a 
subsidiary based on its profitability and performance. Overall, international retailers that 
conform to the salient norms of retailing for all relevant social actors are thought to be 
more legitimate, and better supported by social actors. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Case study methodology was used to apply the institutional model of retail 
internationalization success. Case studies allow the possibility of studying an 
organization and its environment in a natural setting and obtaining rich insights into 
complex processes (Yin 1994). Specifically, the case of Home Depot’s entrance and 
withdrawal from the Chilean market was chosen because the context of this case is highly 
pertinent to the objective of this study (Stake 2000).  
Fieldwork and Data Collection 
Following the recommendations of Yin (1994), Eisenhardt (1989), and Stake 
(2000), the fieldwork proceeded in two phases that preceded and followed the withdrawal 
of Home Depot from the Chilean market. The first phase took place in the three-month 
period, from October to December 2001. Home Depot had already announced its 
intention to withdraw from the market. The second phase from January to April 2002, 
following Home Depot’s sale of its stores to its local partner Falabella. Home Depot was 
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re-named Home Store and a new logo was introduced, but there were few changes in the 
format and merchandise. Data collection activities ended after seven months of fieldwork 
and resulted in a database containing a 53-page field diary, 22 audiotapes, and 233 pages 
of single spaced interview transcripts in Spanish and English.  
Historical research and information of the industry and main actors was included 
in this analysis, such as web pages with corporate history, dissertations related to the 
industry and other publications. Press articles related to the retailing industry of the past 
10 years from Chilean newspapers and magazines (e.g., El Mercurio, Estrategia, El 
Diario, and Revista Capital) were also collected during the months of study. Other related 
documents in the database were industry reports, government publications, and press 
articles. Recommendations from Golder (2000) were used to evaluate the authenticity of 
the sources of evidence, and the evidence itself. 
Participant observation was used to examine the actual retail practices used by the 
main different social-actor competitors in the field of home improvement retailing in 
Chile (Sodimac-Home Center, Easy, Home Depot, Constructor, Construmart), in order to 
infer the salient norms of retailing within this field. This was done through observation of 
the following retail practices of the five major retailers of home improvement located in 
Las Condes, Santiago: (1) store layout and atmosphere, including parking, decoration, 
symbols, colors and light; (2) general merchandise display and assortment, (3) employee 
attire, (4) hours of operation and special services to consumers, and (5) practices related 
to societal norms (community, family, nation). Visits were made to the five stores during 
different times of the day, for a period of one week during the month of November 2001.   
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Interviews followed McCracken (1988)’s long interview approach, and followed 
the required procedures from the university ethics committee. During Phase 1, nine 
interviews with experts in the field of home improvement /DIY in Chile were conducted, 
and the interviews ranged from 45 to 100 minutes, with an average of 70 minutes. 
Informants were recruited by the first author based on their representativeness and 
knowledge of this field, through a pre-specified procedure. Real names were changed for 
purposes of confidentiality. During Phase 2, five additional interviews were held with 
executives that had participated in Home Depot’s operation in Chile as employees, 
advisors, or partners, and six interviews were held with end consumers. The duration of 
the interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 95 minutes, with an average of 68 minutes.  
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
Following McCracken’s (1988) final step of discovery of analytic categories, and 
Spiggle’s (1994) work on analysis and interpretation of qualitative research, inferences 
resulted from the process of analysis and interpretation used to generate conclusions, 
insights, and connections to the conceptual framework or theory. The main objective of 
the analysis and interpretation of the interview data was to determine categories, 
relationships and assumptions based on the respondent’s opinions of the topic through a 
movement from data to observation and to conclusions, and at the same time by iterating 
with the theory (McCracken 1988). This analytic process consisted of several stages each 
representing a higher level of generality, in a circular way to arrive at conclusions, and to 
generate or confirm conceptual schemes and theories that describe the data.  
Interpretation of the data occurred by iterating back and forth from the data to the 
theory and back to the data again in order to make sense of the data. The main goal was 
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to obtain a holistic and illuminating grasp of meaning (Spiggle 1994). Overall, 
interpretations of the data, along with triangulation from participant observation and 
institutional analysis resulted in common themes.    
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Home Depot is the world’s largest home improvement retailer, selling a broad assortment 
of merchandise at competitive prices to do-it-yourself consumers, professional 
contractors, and builders (www.homedepot.com).  Home Depot was founded in 1978 by 
Bernie Marcus and Arthur Blank, and in 2001, the firm had more than 1,300 stores open 
throughout the United States, Canada, Puerto Rico, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile 
(www.homedepot.com). Home Depot reported net sales of $53.6 billion during the fiscal 
year 2001, which represents an increase of 17% from the previous year with 
approximately 250,000 people employed in the company (www.homedepot.com). 
Additionally, for six consecutive years, Home Depot has been ranked, by Fortune 
magazine as America's Most Admired Specialty Retailer (www.homedepot.com). 
According to its founders, Home Depot’s main source of competitive advantage is “The 
Three Legged Stool Strategy,” which consists in providing consumers with wide 
assortment, low price and high service quality (Marcus and Blank 1999).  
Home Depot started its internationalization process, by entering Canada in 1994, 
followed by Chile in 1998, Argentina, 1999, and Mexico in 2001 
(www.homedepot.com). The first Home Depot store in Chile opened on August 28th 
1998, with 400 Chilean associates, and a partnership with a local firm, Falabella. The 
President of Chile and his wife attended the inauguration, and thousands of consumers 
visited this store during the first months (Marcus and Blank 1999, p.301). Home Depot 
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implemented its standard retail format in Chile because it worked well in the U.S. and 
Canada. The owners believed that Home Depot would soon dominate the Chilean market 
because of its low prices and excellent service quality. A second Home Depot store 
opened in December of 1998, and by the end of the year 2000, Home Depot had opened 
five stores in Chile.  
However, after three years of operating in Chile, the reality was very different 
from the initial prediction. Home Depot’s operation in Chile resulted in losses that 
reached Ch$658.4 million in the first semester, which was 149% more than in the same 
period of the year 2000 (Diario El Mercurio, Sept. 29, 2001). These results were mirrored 
in Argentina, and this situation led the company to announce the intention to exit both 
countries in Oct. 25, 2001 (www.homedepot.com). Chilean operations were sold to its 
partner Falabella SAIC in Jan. 2002. 
Salient Norms of Home Improvement Retailing in Chile 
Respondents thought that the industry of home improvement and DIY in Chile 
was much less developed than in the U.S., and still very fragmented, with the top three 
retailers representing only 20-25% of the market. Additionally, although Home Center 
and Home Depot had been trying to develop the concept of DIY in Chile, this was still 
not seen as a common practice for Chileans. Respondents indicated that in Chile, people 
don’t repair their homes by themselves, and instead prefer to hire contractors or 
“maestros” to repair or renovate their homes.   
Today the DIY market in Chile is definitively not developed. First, it is 
necessary to make a very big change on society because people do not like 
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to make their own things, and prefer to delegate it to a third person 
(Ricardo, retail marketing manager). 
Honestly, I don’t think that it works in Chile because people don’t like to 
read instructions, they don’t have the necessary tools, and this complicates 
things and makes it more expensive than hiring a maestro. In the U.S., 
people have their garages converted into a workshop, and you can make or 
fix anything with lots of different tools. In Chile, nobody has the 
collection of tools needed to make repairs, or the necessary information 
(Anita, contractor).  
I don't paint or fix my house by myself because I find it very difficult. You 
have to have some kind of expertise to do this. If I start painting my house 
I will probably make a mess, the paint will fall on the floor. So, I prefer 
other people do the job. In addition, I don't find the cost of hiring a 
maestro high. If I decided to paint the rooms, then probably it would take 
me much longer and I would have to quit working. I find that this is a bad 
investment (Carmen, consumer). 
This difference in the level of development of DIY activities between the U.S. 
and Chile was reflected in a lower level of consumer involvement in DIY activities. 
Consumers gave more importance to the attractiveness of the store, service quality, 
assortment of merchandise for the home, and decoration products, rather than DIY 
assortment or low price.    
The most important attributes for consumers selecting a store is the 
novelty of products, and the possibility of new ideas and projects for the 
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home. Another important attribute is service quality, and the clinics. The 
location of the store is important, but not only the closeness to the home, 
but also the access to the store. Although prices are important, the general 
atmosphere of the store must be attractive with a focus on the family 
(Ricardo, retail marketing manager).  
In contrast, for contractors and the more involved consumers, salient norms 
consisted in low price, DIY merchandise assortment, location, and parking facilities. 
I buy where it is cheaper. It is also important that the parking space is 
wide, with the possibility of loading products directly into my truck. 
Location of stores is important because they must be close to the 
construction sites (Jose, constructor). 
Differences between Chile and the U.S. were also found in the importance given 
to relationships and communication within the industry. For example, respondents 
indicated that competitors and suppliers regularly met at social or business events and 
often communicated by phone. Thus, relational norms were more salient in Chile than in 
the U.S., which is consistent with the collectivistic nature of Chile (Hofstede 1980).  
“I talk very often with my competitors. There is usually much communication in 
this market among competitors. This is very Chilean, but the people at Home 
Depot weren’t allowed to do so” (Patricio, Home Depot Chilean Manager).    
In addition, the data suggests that membership in business group or belonging to a 
business family is highly valued in Chile and impacts the performance of foreign 
executives in the fact that they are not perceived trustworthy. Latin American cultures in 
general have a fairly low level of trust in people who are not family or close friends. 
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Chileans in particular, although they will confront risk, do not trust easily (Eyzaguirre 
1967). A common trait among Spaniards is that they are usually loyal first to their 
families, second to friends, third to the friends of the family, next to friends of the friends, 
and lastly, to the beggar in the path (Albert 1996). 
Being general manager of an important firm in Chile is like being member 
of a club. They attend similar clubs, vacation resorts, [and] conferences. 
They socialize with their families, [and] their children go to the same 
private schools. There is a whole cultural and social aspect of the Chilean 
society that may be hard to understand for some foreign executives 
(Mario, consultant). 
The saliency of family norms for retailing was also much higher in Chile than in 
the U.S., a product of the importance of family members in Hispanic countries, and also 
because of the presence of traditional gender roles still present in Chile, where women 
are in charge of the homes, and men of working outside the homes. The strong sense of 
family and the loyalty owed to family are evident in all aspects of social life in Latin 
America (Albert 1996). Assortment of home products becomes more salient for 
consumers shopping with the whole family. Store layout and physical environment is 
expected to be comfortable, pleasant, nicely decorated and with places for consuming 
food because of the family nature of the shopping activity on weekends.  
We have done several studies with consumers, and we have found that 
women decide where the family will shop, especially during the week-
ends (Ricardo, retail marketing manager).  
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My time is very valuable and I don’t want to waste my time during a 
Saturday or Sunday looking for merchandise because I prefer to go home 
and spend time with my children (Harry, consumer). 
Prices are not important for me or my wife at all. The most important 
attribute for choosing a store is the product offering. I like to find new 
merchandise and decorations for my home. I am also interested in leaving 
the store happy (Pablo, consumer).  
Some of the male informants indicated that usually their wives shopped for 
decoration and home products, while they preferred to shop for home improvement 
products. Although these male respondents enjoyed shopping at Home Depot, and 
considered that it provided lower prices, their wives didn’t like the store and preferred to 
shop at Home Center or Easy.   
On week-ends, I can’t go to Home Depot with my wife, because she finds 
Home Depot boring and ugly. However, if I have to buy home 
improvement products I would go to Home Depot because it is cheaper 
(Jose, constructor). 
I liked Home Depot because I am a constructor, and the store has wide 
aisles and better prices than Home Center, but my wife definitively didn’t 
like it. She found it too big, too cold, not many things for here to shop. 
Many people visited Home Depot stores, but they didn’t like it and went 
back to the format that suited them best (Pablo, supplier).  
Additionally, the data showed that the Chilean business community and 
professional associations were relevant social actors in the general retail industry in 
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Chile. Because retailing is an important activity in Chile, retail executives are important 
people and are expected to behave properly according to socially established norms. The 
data suggest that these salient norms for retail executives consist in having high levels of 
education and income, and also belonging to an aristocratic Spanish social class. Personal 
relationships among retail executives were valued, and having a Chilean, educated 
background was a salient norm for retail managers and the general business community. 
However, these nationalistic expectations were clearly not aimed so much at Anglo 
backgrounds but at other Latin American countries that have a high level of native 
backgrounds (e.g., Mexicans, Peruvians or Central American). This can be explained by 
the institutional analysis of the Chilean society that suggested that Chileans try to forget 
their native roots.  
There is a whole cultural and social aspect that may be hard to understand 
for some foreign executives. International companies tend to put in these 
top positions, people who are much lower socially and culturally than their 
peers in Chile. Since the size of the Chilean markets is much smaller, the 
top managers brought by these firms to Chile are generally store managers 
in a U.S. city with a socio cultural level much lower than a top manager in 
Chile. These people have a hard time integrating themselves culturally and 
socially to the Chilean society and reality. In other words, socially, these 
managers are not well accepted by their peer executives in Chile. For 
example, the executives of Home Depot in Chile were people of a very 
low cultural background. These people probably were store managers in 
the U.S., and their merit perhaps was to be a good manager of a city store 
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and in many cases the ability to speak Spanish. I think that all of them had 
relationship problems with their peers, with suppliers, and with Chilean 
executives from other companies (Mario, consultant).  
Executives who don’t comply to the norms of education are less likely to 
be perceived as worthy to participate in the business community and engage in 
personal relationships with other executives such as suppliers, bankers, and large 
customers. This lack of embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) hinders the 
performance of international firms with a lower probability of obtaining 
preferential locations for stores, discounts from suppliers, large construction 
projects from relevant firms, and perhaps higher interest rates for loans.   
In conclusion, the empirical data suggest that differences between the home 
improvement industry in Chile and the U.S. are reflected in the saliency of the norms of 
retailing. Particularly, differences were found in the saliency of family norms that were 
higher in Chile than in the U.S., a product of the importance of family members in 
Hispanic countries, and also because of the presence of traditional gender roles still 
present in Chile, where women are in charge of the homes, and men of working outside 
the homes.   
Consumers, and specially women, were found relevant decision makers for store 
choice, and were expected to find a wide assortment of general home merchandise in 
addition to DIY merchandise. This differed from the U.S., where 70% of Home Depot’s 
sales came from DIY consumers (www.homedepot.com). Thus, although consumers 
were relevant social actors for home improvement retailing in both countries, their 
expectations of retail behavior differed. Other relevant social actors for home 
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improvement retailing in Chile were local suppliers, competitors, business community, 
and families. Suppliers were relevant because much of the home improvement 
merchandise was bought locally. The business community was very relevant for home 
improvement retailers because of the strong influence they exerted on the behavior of 
retail organizations.   
Legitimacy of Home Depot in Chile 
The Chilean Home Depot office was considered legitimate by the parent firm, the 
international community, host contractors and employees. However, Home Depot Chile 
didn’t achieve legitimacy from many relevant social actors in Chile such as its partner 
Falabella, Chilean managers, the business community, suppliers, competitors, families, 
and women. All of these social actors were relevant for Home Depot’s legitimation in 
Chile. Falabella was well-respected in the Chilean market, with more than 50 years of 
retail experience, and was very unhappy with Home Depot’s performance and attempted 
several times to participate in their decision-making, unsuccessfully.   
Clearly Home Depot is very successful in the U.S., and I always thought 
that partnering with Falabella was a great idea, because of the experience 
of Falabella in this market. But Home Depot excluded Falabella totally 
from its operations in Chile. They even weren’t allowed to participate in 
the meetings held by the board of directors. My impression is that these 
firms [from outside Chile] feel that it is a waste of time to try to combine 
their actions with a local partner, and they don’t want to complicate things 
in an attempt to obtain consensual decisions (David, retail consultant).  
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Second, Home Depot executives were not well respected by the general business 
community, and by suppliers and competitors because of their low educational and social 
background.  
The managers that Home Depot had were people from Central America. 
They had high levels of spending, they went to the best hotels, cars, and 
they flew in business class always. The company never learned how to 
adjust to a smaller market. They came into the market thinking of having a 
huge project. And they acted as if this huge project existed, when they 
only had 2-3 stores. So although these stores were profitable, the managers 
spent like crazy. The problem was when you summed up all the expenses 
then of course you had an unbalanced structure and losses.  They were 
totally wrong in how they had to approach this market. They came to 
Chile and implemented a structure that seemed like they were going to 
take over the market (Henry, director of Falabella).  
Similarly, Chilean suppliers of home improvement merchandise found that Home 
Depot was not the large retailer that had been predicted, and consistently charged this 
new retail entrant higher prices while at the same time offering less favorable conditions. 
Although Home Depot paid suppliers on time, Home Depot was never able to sell a large 
enough volume to obtain the best purchasing conditions, so they never conformed to an 
important supplier norm.   
They reminded us that they are the biggest DIY retailer in the world, and 
we didn’t like their attitude. In fact, we didn’t sell to Home Depot in two 
years, and during this period we even got closer to Sodimac. Home Depot 
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told us that they could import anything from the U.S. However, this is not 
so easy and at the least takes 60 days. As a result, they had many stock 
outs, and couldn’t supply big projects. The managers were Chileans, but 
with an American style, with strict rules and norms. All their catalogues 
were in English (Juan, supplier).  
Finally, women and family members considered Home Depot stores as 
unattractive, cold, not welcoming, and lacking attractive merchandise for them. The data 
show that almost all consumers preferred to shop at Home Center, rather than other retail 
stores, because of attractiveness of their stores and merchandise assortment, and the 
importance given to family norms.  
I find Home Depot store ugly inside: a big and cold warehouse, which is 
very cold, especially in winter. There is no coffee shop, no place to stay, 
no seats. It is very, very uninviting. Home Center instead is a nicer and 
more comfortable store. It makes our work more fun. Home Depot is 
different from Home Center. Home Depot seems to have a wider 
assortment for the constructors or maestros, but not for me. In Home 
Depot there is no fun (Sofia, decorator). 
In sum, Home Depot didn’t comply with several salient norms of retailing in 
Chile, especially norms of family and relational exchange.   
Reasons for Lack of Legitimacy in the Chilean Market  
Although several reasons were mentioned above to account for Home Depot’s poor 
performance in Chile, in general, the interview data suggested that Home Depot’s lack of 
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success was the outcome of two main mistakes: a lack of managerial capability to operate 
in a foreign market and strong host competition. 
Lack of Management Knowledge of Local Norms. There was a consensus among 
respondents that the main problem of Home Depot in Chile was that it attempted to 
implement a standard retail format in Chile without any modification. According to 
expert respondents, this problem was due to the lack of knowledge of the Chilean culture 
by the management team of the Home Depot subsidiary. These respondents considered 
that the main problem with this American chain was that it didn’t study the Chilean 
international market in advance, in order to determine the needs and requirements of 
consumers in this market. For example, Home Depot’s store atmosphere and lay out of 
the store wasn’t attractive for women consumers, who are the relevant decision makers.  
Home Depot brought experts in retailing, but with little knowledge of our 
culture and of consumer preferences. This is not transferable directly. For 
example, you can’t just take a know-how developed in another country 
and implement it here without adaptation. It has nothing to do with the fact 
of being American, because other American chains are successful in Chile 
(Pedro, retail professor). 
Home Depot’s format didn’t work in Chile, because Chile has a different 
culture than the U.S. Home Depot didn’t consider this difference in 
culture. They are masters in this business, and number one in the world, 
and they know very much about logistics and how this business works. 
But they didn’t consider our market. They didn’t put the customer in first 
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place. They said, this is what we have, take it or leave it. And the customer 
left it (Ricardo, retail marketing manager).  
Strong Competition. Experts indicated that Home Depot encountered strong 
competitors in Chile, such as Sodimac with its Home Center format, and Constructor, 
Easy, and Construmart.  Local retailers of home improvement had prepared for Home 
Depot’s arrival, and were not only attempting to strengthen even more their performance 
on the salient societal-based norms, but were also improving their performance on the 
salient norms where Home Depot did perform well. Sodimac, especially, had actively 
prepared for Home Depot’s arrival by developing an aggressive strategy of hiring a new 
CEO, training the employees, opening more stores, and improving logistics. Furthermore, 
Sodimac was seen as having fought strongly with Home Depot, and as having won the 
battle. Today, Sodimac is perceived as transforming into a much better company, more 
efficient, more profitable, with better service quality, better image, and better prices. In 
fact, other retailers such as Easy and smaller ferreterias (small, independent home 
improvement products retailers) had also followed Sodimac in this battle against Home 
Depot. For example, Easy had renovated all of its stores and had two store openings 
projected for 2002.   
Home Depot came with a mentality a little presumptuous, thinking that 
their source of competitive advantage was going to be successful, but not 
recognizing that there was also a firm, similar to Home Depot, that was 
working in its own market, with a force much more rooted in Chile, a very 
efficient competitor (Jorge, manager of a trade organization). 
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Home Depot’s Chilean competitors had a strong reaction when Home 
Depot entered, and were successful. Sodimac (Home Center) obtained the 
advantage over Home Depot mainly because its concept was slightly 
different and perhaps more realistic for the Chilean market.  When Home 
Depot arrived, the first thing that Home Center did was to hire executives 
of Home Depot in order to try to copy as much as possible their model, but 
they also had knowledge of Home Depot’s weaknesses (Mario, consultant 
to Home Depot). 
Home Depot seemed to have overlooked its competition in the Chilean market, 
especially Sodimac. This was due to the lack of knowledge regarding the Chilean market, 
held by Home Depot’s management team in Chile, who insisted in implementing a retail 
format without considering if it needed adjustment to compete with local retailers.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This case study of Home Depot’s entrance into and withdrawal from the Chilean market 
overall supports utility of using institutional theory to understand retail 
internationalization success. The data show that international success becomes a difficult 
mission, which depends on how well a retailer conforms to salient institutional norms of 
retailing in each country in which it operates in order to obtain legitimacy from social 
actors. In the case of Chile, home improvement activity is less often performed by the 
home owner and more by third party maestros. Furthermore, products and services in 
home improvement stores must reflect the broader interests of all family members 
performing traditional gendered shopping roles on a collective family shopping occasion. 
At the store and corporate level, managers and executives need to be embedded in a 
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broader network that reflects the higher social status of their positions in Chile in addition 
to facilitating informal communications with other relevant social actors. Additionally, 
appropriate prescriptions by their local partner were not heeded.  
Beyond the failure to adhere to relevant societal and relational norms, the scale of 
Home Depot in Chile was not large enough to command the attention it would be 
accorded in its domestic market. Furthermore, Home Depot’s competitors in Chile 
anticipated the US retailer’s arrival and made changes to their own operations in order to 
blunt the impact of Home Depot’s source of competitive advantage. Thus, retailer 
legitimacy is a difficult challenge for international retailers that come from a distant 
institutional environment, and requires them to not only have a source of competitive 
advantage, but additionally and most important, require an experienced management 
team to legitimate this source of advantage.  
This study contributes and expands previous theoretical models of retail 
internationalization that address the potential effect of the social and economic 
environment on internationalization outcomes (e.g., Vida and Fairhurst 1998; Alexander 
and Myers 2000). Most of the environmental factors mentioned in the international 
literature as barriers that international firms encounter when expanding abroad, were 
reflected in the institutional norms of retailing. For example, host government laws, 
cultural factors, competitive factors and social elements were all reflected in the 
economic-based and societal based norms of retailing of each country. These 
environmental differences affected the success of Home Depot and other American 
retailers in Chile, because they had to operate in a new environment with different salient 
Comentario [SJA6]: My sense 
is that other articles have 
considered this “potential effect” 
and what should be said here is 
that the use of institutional theory 
“expands previous theoretical 
models”.  
 26
norms that were sometimes difficult to perceive. Social factors, such as relational norms 
and family norms, were especially important for Home Depot in Chile. 
The interview data also suggest that the main mistake of international retailers 
who do not succeed is that they are unable to effectively legitimize themselves in this 
new environment. These findings confirm the notion that although internationalizing 
firms may be very successful in their home markets, many times they loose sight of 
environmental differences and the barriers that can exist in a new market, especially those 
related to the cultural and social environment. Specifically, the problem is that they 
transfer their source of advantage (e.g., retail format) from their home countries, but 
without considering potential differences in the host environment. For example, Home 
Depot tried to perform in Chile as they did in the U.S., without considering the need for 
adaptation. Overall, they thought that their retail practices would work well everywhere. 
Overall, these findings support previous retailing studies that view internationalization 
success as the ability of retailers to adapt and implement a retail concept to a new and 
different environment (Dupuis and Prime 1996; O’Grady and Lane 1997; Evans et. al. 
2000).   
Finally, the case study of Home Depot suggests that international executives and 
the top executives from the home country office must be continuously committed, alert, 
and flexible to adaptation during the whole internationalization process and host 
operation, and not only prior to entering the market. The internationalization process for 
retailers is a continuous and dynamic process, and does not finish once the retailer is 
already operating in a new market. On the contrary, this period is when retail executives 
must be most alert and committed to this endeavor. Future research should examine the 
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managerial characteristics of international retailers necessary to increase the likelihood of 
success in foreign markets.  
Implications for Managers 
Managers that participate in the internationalization process should be able to 
perceive, understand and incorporate country differences in the internationalization 
strategy. This means that managers must be aware that differences exist among countries, 
even between geographically close countries such as the U.S., Mexico and Canada.  
The main issue for international retail managers is that they must adapt their retail 
practices and formats to fit the needs and expectations of host consumers, suppliers, 
employees, families, and business community. They must make modifications to their 
retail concept in such a way that they still maintain their source of competitive advantage. 
The main objective therefore, is to implement this source of advantage effectively and 
gain legitimation from all key constituencies. For example, while maintaining its retail 
format and most practices from the U.S., Home Depot could have increased legitimacy 
from end consumers by incorporating additional home merchandise, and also by 
improving the store atmosphere, light and layout. Home Depot could have also hired a 
Chilean executive to lead the operation in Chile, with a better knowledge of expectations 
and proper behavior among the business community.  
Usually, internationalizing firms send store managers that have been successful in 
the home domestic market, as managers of their international operations. Although these 
managers have generally strong knowledge of the firm’s source of competitive 
advantage, because of their position, usually they do not belong to the host country and 
have little knowledge of institutional pressures. The previous managerial implications 
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indicate that therefore it is necessary to train these international managers so that they can 
appreciate international market differences and be committed in responding to them, or 
else hire a local manager for the host operation.  
In conclusion, international retailers from developed countries should not assume 
that their format would necessarily be successful in foreign markets. The level of saliency 
of the institutional norms and the strength of local competitors are both important to 
consider when deciding on the legitimation strategy.  
Future Research 
Additional research considering other internationalization successes and failures 
for different types of retailers would help enhance the conceptualization and 
understanding of the drivers for retail internationalization success. Another interesting 
avenue for future research is to apply the institutional approach for examining the 
internationalization process of other types of retailers such as grocery and department 
stores. Additionally, this approach could be applied to other countries.  
Another topic that requires further investigation concerns retail management 
characteristics that can improve the likelihood of achieving retailer legitimacy in a 
foreign market. Antecedents of managerial international capability for retail firms must 
be identified. Finally, this study also suggested an alternative operationalization to 
retailer success in a foreign market, from traditional measures of sales and market share. 
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